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Abstract
We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpayers resulting from the
German income tax (tax year 2007). Using survey data that have been
raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we find evidence for a
considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpayers. Taxable
income and a higher education (university degree) are positively correlated
with compliance costs, while the time effort of female taxpayers is signifi-
cantly lower. By contrast, joint filing of married couples reduces the burden
of tax compliance. The aggregate cost estimate of German income
taxpayers amounts to €6 to €9 billion, respectively, 3.1 to 4.7 percent of the
income tax revenue in 2007. This estimate is higher than latest projections
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in a number of other European countries like Spain and Sweden, but lower
than estimates for the United States and Australia.
Keywords
tax complexity, tax compliance costs, compliance burden, personal income
tax
The economic costs of taxation not only consist of the tax payment itself
and the excess burden but also of the time effort and the monetary expenses
spent on tax compliance and tax planning. As these operations are at least
partially caused by tax regulations and compliance obligations, they are to
be interpreted as an additional ‘‘tax effort’’ reducing the economic
resources of individuals without increasing the fiscal budget of the govern-
ment. Therefore, compliance costs have a negative impact on the efficiency
of a tax system (Alm 1996) and increase the marginal costs of funds
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996). They may also affect tax evasion and tax
avoidance (Alm 1999; Erard and Ho 2003).
In spite of a comprehensive literature on the compliance costs of individ-
uals in countries like Australia, Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (for a review of the literature see, e.g., Evans 2003, 2008),
empirical evidence for Germany as the largest EU economy is scarce. There
have been two studies on compliance costs of individuals that are exclusively
available in German language (Tiebel 1986; Rheinisch-Westfa¨lisches Institut
fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung [RWI] 2003; for research on business taxpayers, see
Kayser et al. 2004; Eichfelder and Schorn 2012). The analysis of Tiebel
(1986) is outdated and rather poorly documented. The survey data of RWI
(2003) has not been used for an analysis of the key cost drivers or for project-
ing an aggregate cost estimate and is publicly not available. Therefore, the
compliance burden of German individuals resulting from the personal income
tax is still an open question of research.
There are specific properties of the German income tax that might be
interesting from an international perspective. In contrast to self-reporting
systems like in the United States, German taxes on income are calculated
by the fiscal authorities. Hence, the taxpayer is committed to declare the
taxable earnings and deductions, but not to calculate the taxable income and
the tax payment. This may reduce compliance costs of private households by
cost of the administration. Furthermore, German wage earners are typically
not obliged to file an income tax statement if their income does not include
a significant amount (more than €410 per year) of nonwage earnings. This is
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due to the detailed German pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system and implies a
reduction of compliance costs of private households by cost of the employers.
Another important aspect is the possibility of married adults to file jointly. In
these cases, the sum of taxable incomes of both spouses is divided by two to
calculate the average tax rate and the tax payment.
In addition to cost measurement, the identification of the key cost drivers
is an important question of research. If the compliance burden is correlated
to sources of income, one may expect that tax complexity not only affects
the household’s resources but also the economic decision making. For
example, Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) observe higher compliance costs
for self-employed taxpayers that might negatively affect self-employment
and impair economic growth (Djankov et al. 2002; Grilo and Irigoyen
2006). Furthermore, the identification of the key cost drivers may help
simplify the tax system.
In our contribution, we analyze the time effort and the monetary
expenses of German self-employed persons and wage earners resulting
from the personal income tax. Our investigation is based on survey informa-
tion raised between December 2008 and April 2009 within a project that
was funded by the German Ministry of Finance. The data include cost
estimates as well as socioeconomic information on private taxpayers and
allow us to approximate the aggregate income tax compliance burden of
German households. Furthermore, we investigate for the first time the key
cost drivers of the compliance burden in Germany.
We find that the compliance costs of German households amount to €6 to
€9 billion or 3.1 to 4.7 percent of the personal income tax revenue in the tax
year 2007 (including solidarity tax surcharge as a supplement of 5.5 percent
to the German personal income tax). This is higher than latest empirical
results for Sweden and Spain, but lower than cost estimates for Australia
and the United States. Combining our result with previous research, it can
be stated that compliance cost estimates of US households are significantly
higher compared to studies for other countries.
Regarding the key cost drivers, we find a clearly positive effect of
taxable income, education, and self-employment, while the positive
effect of age is only significant in a Heckman specification. We also
find a lower time burden for females. In addition, the compliance bur-
den of married dual-income earners is considerably lower compared to
other households with an identical taxable income. This can be taken as
evidence that the joint taxation of married couples not only accounts for
horizontal equity but also enhances the cost-efficiency of the income
tax.
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This article is organized as follows. In the second section, we exemplify
our database including the sampling and the methodology of cost measure-
ment. In the third section, we describe the multivariate analysis identifying
the determinants of the compliance cost burden. The aggregate burden of
the German income tax is projected in the fourth section including a
comparison to international estimates. The fifth section presents our
conclusions.
Data Set
Methodology, Sampling, and Cost Measurement
Similar to previous research (Evans 2003, 2008), our analysis is based on a
survey of private households. As documented by the literature (Sandford
1995; Blazˇic´ 2004; Evans 2008), mail surveys on tax compliance costs may
be significantly biased by misunderstandings and mistakes of survey parti-
cipants. In addition, nonresponse is an important problem. In Germany,
response rates of the latest surveys on compliance costs of households and
businesses lie in a range of 7.3 percent to 8.6 percent (RWI 2003; Kayser
et al. 2004; Eichfelder and Schorn 2012).
According to the literature on cost measurement, personal interviews are
typically regarded as more reliable (Sandford 1995; Blazˇic´ 2004). In
addition, nonresponse is expected to be lower. Therefore, it was decided
to select the cost data by face-to-face interviews. All interviewers were
informed on the term tax compliance costs and other aspects of the
questionnaire by a training seminar. The data were collected between
December 2008 and April 2009 as part of a policy–advisory project funded
by the German Ministry of Finance.
While the use of face-to-face interviews in general can be regarded as a
major benefit of our database, there is also a number of disadvantages. First
of all, funding was not sufficient to conduct interviews in all parts of Germany.
Thus, sampling was focused on the German member states Berlin and Bran-
denburg. From our perspective, this does not greatly affect our results, as there
are no regional disparities with regard to the German income tax law and our
analysis controls for important socioeconomic parameters (see the ‘Multivari-
ate Analysis’ and the ‘Estimation of the Aggregate Burden’ sections).
A bigger challenge emanates from the typically low-response rates of
Germany (usually below 10 percent) in conjunction with the project’s bud-
get constraints. As the generation of a representative random sample with a
sufficient number of usable responses for all relevant household types was
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not regarded as realistic, interviewers had to select subjects based on a quota
plan considering gender, age, education, and monthly net income. The
corresponding frequency in the population was taken from the 2008 statis-
tical yearbook for Germany (German Federal Statistical Office 2008b).
While quota sampling has been frequently used in economic research (e.g.,
Throsby and Withers 1986; Gallopel-Morvan et al. 2010), it does not result in a
probability sample. This might affect the representativeness of cost estimates if
cost-relevant characteristics have not been considered by the quota plan. For
example, taxpayers with certain cost-relevant characteristics may have been
neglected. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that quota sampling does not
differ significantly from random sampling (e.g., Cumming 1990).
While the use of quota sampling is clearly a ‘‘second best’’ strategy, it
may nevertheless be a convenient approach to analyze the tax compliance
burden of private households in Germany. As already mentioned, response
rates of German cost surveys are typically low. In addition, nonresponse
may be related to the compliance burden (e.g., Allers [1994] reports evi-
dence for an underestimation of costs due to nonresponse) and other obser-
vable and unobservable characteristics and could, for example, be lower for
self-employed taxpayers with a limited amount of spare time. In a recent
survey, Hansford and Hasseldine (2012) report a response rate of only about
1 percent for self-employed taxpayers and small and medium-sized enter-
prises in the United Kingdom. Hence, while the master sample of a repre-
sentative mail survey will be statistically random, the usable response will
probably not be. In addition, quota sampling is less costly and face-to-face
interviews may increase the validity of cost estimates.
Notwithstanding, using a non-probability sample might be a problem. To
account for this, we tested for the representativeness of our sample with
regard to seven socioeconomic characteristics: level of net income, gender,
age, self-employment, education, marital status, and the fact if a tax return
has been filed. While we find no significant differences regarding the level
of net income, gender, age, education, and the amount of non-filers, we
detect deviations concerning profession and marital status. As suggested
by Berinsky (2006), we calculate weighting factors for adjustment.
Similar to previous research (Evans 2003, 2008), costs are measured by
the monetary equivalent of the compliance effort and additional monetary
expenses (e.g., for a tax advisor). The questions in the survey instrument
were based on previous German research on tax compliance costs (RWI
2003). Therefore, the measurement of the time effort was mainly focused
on the preparation of the income tax return and the collection of receipts for
compliance purposes. The questionnaire asked also for the monetary
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expenses allocated to tax compliance (paid preparation, software, etc.) and
for the person who prepared the income tax return (taxpayer, spouse, tax
preparer, and other person).
In addition, the survey instrument included questions on socioeconomic
information (age, marital status, sex, educational level, and number of
children), and the occupation of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s spouse
(self-employed, employed, public official, other). Information on income
was regarded to be a sensitive issue that could negatively affect survey
response. Therefore, the survey instrument asked not for the household’s
taxable income but for monthly net income classes. Using additional
information on the employment status, we were able to construct a proxy
variable for taxable income. For the corresponding methodology and an
English version of the survey questionnaire, see Blaufus, Eichfelder, and
Hundsdoerfer (2011).
While the applied approach of compliance time measurement should
have been appropriate to capture the main compliance activities (filing the
tax return as well as collecting receipts and related bookkeeping activities,
see DeLuca et al. 2005), the number of requested compliance activities is
smaller than in previous studies and the cost definition is more narrow
(e.g., Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992; Vaillancourt 2010). For example, the
questionnaire did not include a precise question on tax planning or tax
accounting in the broader sense. As a result, the aggregate burden might
have been underestimated if corresponding cost elements have not been
regarded by the survey participants.
On contrary, it may be argued as well that survey instruments with a high
number of cost categories may result in overestimated cost burdens. The
reason is that compliance activities, as mentally represented, are usually not
exclusively related to one compliance-cost category. Therefore, if
compliance hours are allocated to more than one category, double counts
are possible. For example, there has been criticism that general accounting
obligations (bookkeeping, etc.) might have been declared as tax compliance
costs (Sandford 1995; DeLuca et al. 2005). In addition, theoretical and
empirical accounting research suggests that measurement error might
increase in the number of cost categories due to misallocation bias (Cardi-
naels and Labro 2008). With regard to (tax) compliance cost measurement,
Klein-Blenkers (1980) provides evidence that cost estimates increase in the
number of cost categories.1 Therefore, while it is not certain that more
categories increase the reliability of cost estimates, a different number of
cost categories affects in any case the comparability of results among
different cost studies.
Blaufus et al. 805
An additional problem of cost measurement results from the monetiza-
tion of the compliance time effort. There is no universally accepted method
regarding this aspect and this is one reason why international comparisons
of compliance burdens are delicate. For example, Slemrod and Sorum
(1984) rely on the taxpayer’s post-tax earnings per working hour, Sandford,
Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) on subjective estimates of the taxpayer,
Allers (1994) on average gross domestic product per working hour and
Vaillancourt (2010) on the taxpayer’s gross earnings per working hour.
According to Wallschutzky (1995), taxpayer’s own valuations of the
time burden may not be consistent over a number of repeated interviews and
could be biased. From this perspective, the taxpayer’s wage rate appears as
a more appropriate method to obtain a monetized time burden. Assuming a
neoclassic choice between labor and leisure, a rational taxpayer would
assess the marginal working hour with its marginal value of consumption,
respectively the net wage. However, this value does not hold from a society
perspective if the alternative to compliance work is another income-
generating activity (e.g., self-employment; Tran-Nam et al. 2000).
Due to the problems of time measurement and monetization, we
decided to calculate a lower- and an upper-bound estimate of the compli-
ance burden. A corresponding approach accounts for the possibility of
measurement error and enhances the comparability of our results with
other studies. Furthermore, we are able to control for the approach of cost
measurement in our multivariate analysis. To calculate a lower-bound
estimate, we use the time estimates as reported in our survey instrument
and rely on average after-tax earnings per working hour (Blumenthal and
Slemrod 1992; Blazˇic´ 2004). For the monetization of the upper-bound
estimate, we rely on pretax earnings per working hour (Vaillancourt
2010). In addition, we use previous evidence on the allocation of the
compliance time effort (DeLuca et al. 2005) to adjust for a potential
underestimation of time estimates.2
The pretax and the post-tax incomes per working hour for different
income classes have been calculated on the basis of the German Socio-
economic Panel (GSOEP; for a thorough description of the GSOEP, see
Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). We use the wage based on the actual
working hours instead of the contractual working hours.3 As our article
focuses on compliance costs from a society perspective, we do not account
for the (partial) tax deductibility of monetary expenses in the German
income tax code. We also do not consider cash flow benefits resulting from
the delay between the generation of profits and the payment of tax install-
ments (for a detailed description of these effects, see Blazˇic´ 2004).
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Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our gross sample consists of 1,009 interview questionnaires. We excluded
all cases with inconsistent cost estimates and missing information on parts
of the compliance burden and other important variables (115 observations).
Thus, the remaining total sample includes 894 subjects. As has been
mentioned in the previous section, we use weighting factors to account for
a potential sample selection bias.
It has been stated that not all members of the German working popula-
tion are obliged to file a tax return by reason of the PAYE system. As all
necessary compliance activities of non-filers are conducted by the
employer, this group does not bear a significant compliance burden. In our
data, 265 participants did not file an income tax return (26.3 percent of all
1,009 survey respondents), while the other households may have filed either
by choice or by obligation.4 This demonstrates a significant cost reduction
of German households resulting from the PAYE system. As our focus is on
households with a compliance burden, we excluded non-filers from our
final sample leaving 629 subjects with full information on compliance time
and monetary expenses.
The descriptive statistics on socioeconomic factors of our total sample
(894 subjects, unweighted and weighted), the final sample (629 subjects,
weighted), and the underlying population are displayed in table 1.
Most of the respondents in our final sample are males (56 percent), are
employees (79 percent), are married (59 percent), and have an age between
30 and 59 years (83 percent). About 20 percent have a university degree.
The widest deviations from the population can be observed with regard
to marital status. As previously mentioned, we adjust for these deviations
by the calculation of weights.
In table 2, we present weight-adjusted mean values of the lower-bound
and the upper-bound cost burden for a number of subsamples of our final
data set. The four income groups have been selected to include a sufficient
number of taxpayers per employment-income cell (see table 3). On average,
a survey respondent spends between 9.8 hours (lower-bound estimate) and
14.4 hours (upper-bound estimate) on collecting receipts and preparing the
income tax return. This is in line with previous research. Tiebel (1986)
reports on average 11.2 hours for a German household (including the
compliance costs of the German wealth tax), while RWI (2003) estimates
the time effort with 15.8 hours (not adjusted for weights). In addition to the
time effort, an average respondent in our data has monetary expenses
amounting to €180.
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About 64.4 percent (6.3 hours) of the time burden result from the
collection of receipts (lower-bound estimate). Therefore, the documentation
requirements in calculating taxable income are the most time-consuming
compliance activity. This corresponds to previous research on the compli-
ance costs of income taxation in Germany (RWI 2003) and other countries
(Vaillancourt 1989; Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992; Delgado Lobo, Salinas-
Jime´nez, and Sanz Sanz 2001). Total average compliance costs range from
€298 to €450. Average monetary expenses are making up 40.0 to 60.4 per-
cent of the total burden. While the upper bound (60.4 percent) corresponds
to Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989), the lower bound is in line with













(cases) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Gender Female 406 45.4 45.2 44.4 45.2
Male 488 54.6 54.8 55.6 54.8
Age <20 years 32 3.6 3.1 0.4 3.5
20–29 years 173 19.4 16.0 8.0 17.5
30–39 years 213 23.8 22.8 23.6 24.0
40–49 years 242 27.1 28.1 32.2 29.6
50–59 years 179 20.0 23.0 26.9 20.5
>60 years 55 6.2 7.0 8.8 5.1
Education University
degree
155 18.0 16.0 20.4 16.0
Other 739 82.0 84.0 79.6 84.0
Monthly net
income
< €1,000 292 32.8 32.7 22.8 32.7
€1,000–2,000 412 46.3 44.8 48.4 44.8
€2,000–3,000 130 14.6 14.6 18.0 14.6
> €3,000 56 6.3 8.0 10.8 8.0
Marital status Married 350 39.3 49.6 58.9 49.6
Other 540 60.7 50.4 41.1 50.4
Self-employed No 759 85.0 85.0 79.4 88.7
Yes 134 15.0 15.0 20.6 11.3
Filing mode Self-preparer 244 27.3 25.0 33.9 n.a.
Household 114 12.8 14.6 19.8 n.a.
Advisor 213 23.8 27.8 37.6 n.a.
Other Support 58 6.5 6.4 8.7 n.a.
Non-filer 265 29.6 26.2 – 26.2
Note: n.a. ¼ information not available.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Allers (1994), Delgado Lobo, Salinas-Jime´nez, and Sanz Sanz (2001), and
RWI (2003) with a monetized time effort of about two-thirds of the
compliance burden.
As has been reported by previous research (Blumenthal and Slemrod
1992; Tran-Nam et al. 2000), the burden is unequally distributed among
taxpayers. From table 2, it becomes obvious that compliance costs are
positively related to taxable income and self-employment. The average cost
of an employee lies in a range of €174 to €249, while the corresponding bur-
den of a self-employed is about four to five times higher (€774–1,226). In
addition, we observe a correlation between total costs and the filing mode
with considerably higher costs for taxpayers using a tax advisor. By
contrast, cost differences are limited if the tax return has been filed by the
survey respondent (Self-preparer), by another household member (House-
hold), or by another person (Other support).
Multivariate Analysis
Estimation Approach
In line with the literature (Vaillancourt 1989, 2010; Blumenthal and Slem-
rod 1992), we analyze the compliance burden of German households by an
ordinary least squares model. Due to economies of scale within the
compliance process, we choose a log–log specification. This specification
ensures the normality of the model’s residuals (tested by a Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test) and allows for an interpretation of regression coefficients
as elasticities. For example, a regression coefficient of 0.3 implies that
an increase in the exogenous variable of 1 percent reduces compliance costs
by 0.3 percent. In case of dummy variables, this reasoning does only hold
approximately, due to the fact that a marginal increase in a dummy variable
is not possible (like a 1 percent increase in being a woman). Therefore, the
estimated coefficients have to be recalculated to obtain the correct relative
effect on the compliance burden.5
As income measure, we rely on a proxy for taxable income (for the cal-
culation, see Blaufus, Eichfelder, and Hundsdoerfer 2011). From an
accounting perspective, the number of required tax calculations and
relevant tax positions will increase in pretax earnings. The same holds for
the number of income sources (e.g., capital earnings). In addition, standard
deductions and blanket allowances are more relevant for low-income
taxpayers. Therefore, taxable income accounts also for the complexity of
a tax return. The baseline model can be described by
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CCOSTi ¼ a0 þ a1  TAXABLE INCOMEi þ a2  AGEi
þ a3  SELFEMPLOYMENTi þ a4  JOINT FILINGi
þ a5  UNIVERSITY DEGREEi þ a6 WOMANi
þ a7  CHILDRENi þ Ei:
ð1Þ
The error of the individual i is described by Ei, while a0 to a7 denote the
regression coefficients. The variables are defined as follows:
CCOST: Compliance costs are calculated as the logarithm of the sum of
monetary expenses and the monetized time burden (lower-bound esti-
mate and upper-bound estimate). In addition, we analyze the loga-
rithm of the cost components (time burden and money burden).
TAXABLE INCOME: Logarithm of our taxable income proxy.
AGE: Logarithm of the age of our survey respondents.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT: Dummy variable for self-employed taxpayers.
JOINT FILING: Married couples in Germany are entitled to a joint tax
return. Due to economies of scale, this could result in a decrease of the
cost burden. That holds especially if both household members are
income earners (in other cases, the second spouse would simply not
file a tax return). Thus, we include a dummy variable for married
couples in case of dual-income earners.
UNIVERSITY DEGREE: Dummy variable for respondents with a univer-
sity degree.
WOMAN: Dummy variable for female taxpayers. If the return has not
been filed by another household member, we rely on the sex of the
survey respondent.
CHILDREN: TheGerman tax law provides child benefits depending on
the number of children, child age, and the occupation of a child.
Therefore, we include the logarithm of the number of children entitled
to child benefits increased by one (this is to prevent undefined loga-
rithmic values).
A problem of equation (1) lies in the fact that we control for the complexity
of a tax return only to a limited extent (mainly by TAXABLE INCOME and
SELF-EMPLOYMENT). This issue, which is typical to corresponding
analyses (apart from Vaillancourt [2010] controlling for an impressive
number of tax characteristics), could bias our result. To mitigate this
problem, we construct additional complexity proxies.
Blaufus et al. 811
According to the literature (e.g., Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Eichfelder
et al. 2012), the demand for external advice is positively correlated to tax
complexity. Therefore, we may interpret the demand of a taxpayer for exter-
nal support as a proxy for the subjective complexity of a tax return (see
Eichfelder and Schorn [2012] for an analytical model). Our data include
four filing modes: (1) self-preparation by the survey respondent, (2) pre-
paration by another household member (HOUSEHOLD), (3) preparation
by a certified tax advisor (ADVISOR), and (4) preparation by another third
person (OTHER SUPPORT). Apart from self-preparers as our reference
group, we include dummy variables for each filing mode and expect higher
compliance costs if the support of tax advisors or other third persons has
been requested (as proxies for tax complexity). These dummy variables
account also for the reliability of compliance time estimates if the tax return
has not been filed by the survey respondent (especially in case of HOUSE-
HOLD and OTHER SUPPORT).
We account for heteroscedasticity by the calculation of heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors (Huber/White estimator). We also tested for linearity
(by a Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test [RESET] for lin-
earity in variables), collinearity (by the calculation of variance inflation fac-
tors), and the normality of the model’s residuals. We did not find evidence for
a misspecification or bias of our regression models.
Results
Table 3 documents the regression results for the lower-bound cost estimate
regarding total compliance costs, monetized time burden, and monetary
expenses. For each dependent variable, we estimate one baseline model and
one model including dummy variables on filing mode (ADVISOR, HOUSE-
HOLD, and OTHER SUPPORT) with self-preparation as the reference case.
Corresponding to Vaillancourt (1989, 2010), and Blumenthal and Slem-
rod (1992), we find a positive impact of taxable income. A 1 percent
increase in taxable income increases the total burden by 0.68 to 0.69 per-
cent. This should be driven by three different aspects. (1) The complexity
of a tax return increases in taxable income. For example, bookkeeping obli-
gations and claimed deductions should be positively correlated to gross
earnings and business transactions. (2) The interest in tax planning is
positively correlated with the marginal income tax rate, which increases
in taxable income (e.g., Eichfelder et al. [2012] provide evidence for a
positive correlation of the marginal tax rate and tax advice). (3) The value
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of time allocated to tax compliance (opportunity costs) is on average higher
for taxpayers with a higher taxable income.
As a result from (3), the impact of taxable income on the monetized time
burden is stronger than the effect on monetary expenses. In addition,
the regression coefficients for TAXABLE INCOME are clearly smaller than
one confirming the well-known economies of scale of tax compliance activ-
ities. Hence, the relative cost burden per taxable income is higher for tax-
payers with a low taxable income.
In line with the literature (e.g., Vaillancourt 2010), we also find a strong
and positive effect of self-employment. This can be explained by the more
complex and burdensome compliance and bookkeeping requirements in
case of business earnings. Furthermore, the German PAYE system implies
a cost reduction for wage earners. While German employers are obliged to
comply with the information requirements of wage taxes and social insur-
ance contributions, their employees may use the information of payroll
accounting to file their income tax return.
As SELF-EMPLOYMENT and the dummies on filing mode act as
complexity proxies and are correlated to each other, it seems to be appro-
priate to concentrate on the models 1, 3, and 5 to quantify the partial
increase of compliance costs resulting from self-employment. Therefore,
self-employment increases the cost burden by 166 percent, the time burden
by 65 percent, and monetary expenses by 196 percent with the correspond-
ing regression coefficients (marginal effects) of 0.989, 0.511, and 1.102.
We further find a negative coefficient for JOINT FILING, especially in
case of the time burden. Therefore, compared to households with one
income earner and similar taxable income, the compliance burden of
households with two income earners filing jointly is lower. While the
effect is partially driven by the valuation of the time burden per hour (the
net wage per hour is lower for households with two income earners filing
jointly), it implies a reduction of the aggregate compliance burden of the
income tax.
This is due to economies of scale within the compliance process. As
already mentioned, the estimated elasticity of TAXABLE INCOME with
regard to compliance time is smaller than one. Therefore, tax returns for
high-income earners are relatively cheap in relation to income. The
negative coefficient of JOINT FILING implies that this effect holds even
stronger in case of married joint filers. For that reason, joint filing reduces
the aggregate burden of tax compliance. Our outcome is to some extent
supported by (weak) empirical evidence on the effect of marital status
of Slemrod and Sorum (1984) and Vaillancourt (1989). Vaillancourt
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(2010) finds on the contrary higher compliance costs of married Canadian
taxpayers.
We find an increase in the compliance burden and the time burden by
about one-third for taxpayers with a UNIVERSITY DEGREE, while the cor-
responding coefficient for the money burden is not significant. Our result is
supported by Slemrod and Sorum (1984), Vaillancourt (1989, 2010), and
Mathieu, Waddams Price, and Antwi (2010). From our perspective, there
are two possible explanations for this outcome. (1) Taxpayers with a univer-
sity degree are more interested in compliance work and, especially, in tax
planning. By reason of a higher awareness of tax planning opportunities
(Alstadsæter and Jacob 2012), they may increase their effort. (2) Due to
their higher qualification, taxpayers with a university degree may be less
interested in external support (Slemrod 1989). However, self-preparation
is not necessarily the most cost-efficient tax compliance strategy (Eich-
felder and Schorn 2012). Therefore, if taxpayers with a high qualification
are overconfident (do-it-yourself-man), they might demand for external
support to an insufficient extent.
Similar to Vaillancourt (1989, 2010), there is further evidence that the
time burden of female taxpayers is significantly lower (see Mathieu, Wad-
dams Price, and Antwi [2010] for a somewhat different outcome). Assum-
ing that male taxpayers are more risk-seeking and interested in aggressive
tax planning strategies (Croson and Gneezy 2009), our result could be dri-
ven by higher planning costs of male taxpayers. Another possible explana-
tion is that women have a different and less complex structure of income. In
this case, WOMAN could act as a proxy for tax complexity.
While regression coefficients are typically positive, we do not find
significant results for AGE and (apart from model 1) for children entitled
to child benefits (CHILDREN). Hence, we cannot provide evidence that the
number of children or age is positively correlated with the cost burden.
Vaillancourt (2010) reports similar results for age but also weakly signifi-
cant and positive effects for education deductions in Canada.
We find a higher burden for households demanding for external support
from a certified tax advisor (ADVISOR) or another third person (OTHER
SUPPORT). This fits well with our hypothesis that both dummies act as tax
complexity proxies. The effect is stronger for tax advisors with higher tax
knowledge and a higher price level. Corresponding to model 2, ADVISOR
(OTHER SUPPORT) increases the total burden by 272 percent (44 percent).
For both variables, we observe a reduction of the time burden and a strong
increase in the monetary expenses. Therefore, the use of external support sub-
stitutes time effort with monetary effort.
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In case of tax returns filed by another household member (HOUSE-
HOLD), there is a significantly lower cost burden. This result is partially dri-
ven by lower earnings per hour of households with two adults. Nevertheless,
there is also an effect on the number of compliance hours (not reported in
table 3). From our perspective, there are two potential explanations for that
outcome. (1) Households with two income earners are more cost-efficient due
to within-household economies of scale and specialization advantages (sim-
ilar to the effect of JOINT FILING). (2) If the tax return has been filed by
another person in the household, the compliance process is not fully observa-
ble by the survey respondent. Therefore, HOUSEHOLD may act as a control
variable for a potential underestimation of the compliance burden.
Table 4 documents the corresponding results for the upper-bound cost
estimate. It can be demonstrated that our findings are broadly independent
of the definition and the valuation of the time burden. Nevertheless, a num-
ber of findings are somewhat different. For example, the increase in total
compliance costs (monetized time effort) due to self-employment amounts
to a higher value of 186 percent (130 percent). Furthermore, there is no sig-
nificant effect of OTHER SUPPORT on total compliance costs.
In addition to our primary results, we calculated a number of cross checks
(see also Blaufus, Eichfelder, and Hundsdoerfer 2011). It has already been
stated that questionnaire information might be less reliable if the tax return
has been filed by another household member or another third person (see also
the negative coefficient for HOUSEHOLD in table 4). Therefore, we recalcu-
lated our regression models excluding these observations. The results remain
generally unchanged. We abstain from reporting these results.
In addition, one might argue that the decision to file a tax return results in a
self-selection of households. Therefore, we also estimated a Heckman model
using respondents without a tax return for the sample selection equation. Over-
all, the Heckman results are fairly in line with our baseline case. Therefore, we
refrain from reporting these estimates that can be provided upon request. In line
with table 1, the Heckman results provide evidence that tax filing is positively
correlated with self-employment, taxable income, education, and age. In addi-
tion, if we account for the self-selection, we find a positive effect of age (sig-
nificant) and the number of children (weakly significant) on the cost burden.
This fits well with Vaillancourt (2010) and Eichfelder et al. (2012).
Estimation of the Aggregate Burden
In this section, we use the information of our data to project the aggregate
burden of the German income tax for private households. Comparing this
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cost burden to tax revenue, we are able to derive an estimate of the relative
burden of the German income tax lying on German households. We discuss
our outcome with regard to previous findings.
The calculation of the aggregate burden is based on a microsimulation
approach using the scientific use file of the German Income Tax Statistics
2004 (GITS 2004; see German Federal Statistical Office [2008a] for a
description). This database includes information on tax returns of about
3.5 million German taxpayers (representative 10 percent random sample).
Thus, it is a comprehensive database for the population of German income
taxpayers. The GITS 2004 file does not account for education but includes
detailed information on the number of tax returns and the filing method.
To use the comparative advantages of both databases (our survey sample
adjusted for weights regarding the statistical yearbook 2008 and GITS 2004
file), we derive our aggregate estimate in two steps. In the first step, we use
our survey information to calculate the weight-adjusted compliance burden
per taxable income for different groups of taxpayers. In a second step, we
use the price-adjusted GITS 2004 file to calculate the compliance burden
per tax return. Thus, we use the taxable income in the GITS 2004 to simu-
late the compliance burden by the proportion of compliance costs to taxable
income for each household in the scientific use file. An advantage of this
approach is that it accounts for potential differences in the distribution of
income. Hence, it will be more robust with regard to sample selection.
Taking into account that self-employment has been identified as an
important cost driver (Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Tran-Nam et al. 2000;
Guyton et al. 2003), we differentiate between the compliance costs of
self-employed persons and other taxpayers (almost exclusively employees
and public officials) with regard to four classes of taxable income
(€0–22,000, €22,001–42,000, €42,001–62,000, above €62,000). In order
to prevent cost projections to be driven by outliers, our income classes
have been selected to include a minimum of twenty-five observations per
employment-income cell.
An implicit assumption of our approach is that the compliance burden
of other income sources can be approximated by our survey information. It
has to be considered that almost all taxpayers in the GITS 2004 file rely
either on business income or on employment income as a substantial
income source (96.9 percent of all taxpayers and 95.8 percent of all tax
filers). Taking further into account that respondents with business and
employment income as major income source will have other income
sources as well (e.g., capital income, rent income), we do not expect a sig-
nificant bias of our results.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It has already been mentioned that cost burdens might have been
underestimated if the tax return has been filed by another person of the
household and not by the survey respondent. Accounting for that aspect,
we increase the upper-bound estimate (as our measure for the maximum
compliance burden) for these observations using the regression results for
the HOUSEHOLD dummy in table 4 (model 2). Furthermore, we compute
the ratio of mean compliance costs to mean taxable income instead of
the mean of ratios in order to mitigate the effects of potential outliers. The
relative cost burdens used for extrapolation are presented in table 5.
We find higher relative cost burdens for self-employed persons and
households with a low taxable income. That corresponds to economies of
scale that have been documented in the literature (Tran-Nam et al. 2000;
Blazˇic´ 2004). The economies of scale regarding other taxpayers do not seem
to be as strong as for the self-employed. This conforms to the literature as
well (Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick 1989; Pope and Fayle 1990).
We use the official income tax statistics to simulate the burden for each
tax return. The latest microfile available is from 2004. As our data were
collected in 2008 and 2009, we increase the taxable income in the GITS
2004 file by the index of gross wages in Germany from 2004 to 2008
(7.49 percent).
The burden is calculated by the proportion of compliance costs to taxable
income (table 5). Households with negative income are assumed to have the
same burden as households with an identical amount of positive income.
This fits well with the result of Eichfelder et al. (2012) that the demand
of German taxpayers for tax advice increases in negative income and
accounts for the compliance costs of a tax loss relief. Regarding cases with
zero taxable income, we use the average burden for households in the low-
est income class (€0–22,000). The lower-bound (upper-bound) value is
€401 (€572) for the self-employed and €96 (€130) for other taxpayers.
Compliance costs are assumed to be zero in case of no tax return (26.1 per-
cent all cases in the GITS 2004 file).
We obtain an overall projected compliance burden of the German house-
holds ranging from €6.0 billion (lower-bound estimate) to €9.0 billion
(upper-bound estimate). This amounts to 3.1 to 4.7 percent of the German
income tax revenue in the tax year of 2007 (including solidarity tax
surcharge). By a similar procedure, we calculate a weighted average
compliance time per German taxpaying household ranging from 5.5 to
8.3 hours (see table 5 for the corresponding average time effort within each
employment-income cell).6 Table 6 compares these estimates to interna-
tional evidence.
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We find that the compliance costs of German households are in the upper
middle. While households in latest studies in Canada, Croatia, the Nether-
lands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom seem to have a
lower burden resulting from the income tax, cost estimates for the United
States and Australia are generally higher. In addition, it becomes obvious
that cost estimates for the United States are considerably higher compared
to all other studies. Taking into account the diversity of survey designs
between the various Australian, Canadian, European, and US studies, it is
not likely that this outcome is driven by methodological issues. Hence, the
results of table 6 can be taken as evidence for higher income tax compliance
costs of US households.
A possible explanation for this outcome could be the self-assessment sys-
tem of the US federal income tax. US citizens are obliged to calculate their tax
payments themselves. By contrast, German households are exclusively obli-
gated to file their tax statement, while the tax payment is calculated by the
administration. Furthermore, a fraction of about 26.1 percent of the German
taxpaying population does not file an income tax return at all by reason of the
German PAYE system. German wage earners may also use the information of
payroll accounting as basis for filing their tax return. Furthermore, there are a
number of complex issues within the US income tax system (divergent state
income taxes, alternative minimum tax, a high number of complex tax credits
like the earned income tax credit, etc.) that do not exist in Germany. Taking
into account the joint effects of the complexity of calculations (e.g., the
Table 5. Aggregation Parameters.










Average compliance costs per average taxable income (weighted)
€0–22,000 2.77% 3.95% 35 1.13% 1.53% 82
€22,001–42,000 2.69% 4.47% 28 0.46% 0.75% 234
€42,001–62,000 1.87% 3.18% 29 0.43% 0.62% 111
> €62,000 0.97% 1.45% 33 0.37% 0.55% 77
Average time burden (weighted)
€0–22,000 12.06 hr 21.14 hr 35 3.90 hr 5.51 hr 82
€22,001–42,000 36.28 hr 63.19 hr 28 6.85 hr 9.76 hr 234
€42,001–62,000 23.57 hr 41.43 hr 29 8.31 hr 10.97 hr 111
> €62,000 14.11 hr 26.23 hr 33 8.68 hr 11.92 hr 77




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































alternative minimum tax) and the requirements of the self-assessment system,
the high tax compliance burden for private households in the United States
should not be unexpected.
Nevertheless, it has to be considered that international comparisons on the
basis of existing studies can be biased by methodological and theoretical
issues. There are at least five aspects of a potential bias: (1) there are differ-
ences in sampling methodologies; for example, Klun (2004) and Blazˇic´
(2004) do not include self-employed taxpayers with a high cost burden.
Therefore, the estimates for Slovenia and Croatia will be biased downward
compared to studies including self-employed taxpayers. (2) There are differ-
ences in the definition of the cost burden and the design of the survey instru-
ment. (3) The valuation of the time effort is not standardized. For example,
Pope and Fayle (1990) use a considerably higher cost value per hour than
Tran-Nam et al. (2000). (4) The cost burden per tax revenue is significantly
affected by the tax rate. Hence, a low tax rate implies a comparatively high
proportion of compliance costs in relation to tax revenue (as tax revenue typi-
cally increases in the tax rate). (5) There exist additional compliance costs,
costs of the tax administration and tax revenues that are not included within
the cost estimates in table 6. Regarding Allers (1994), the cost fraction is
biased downward by the fact that this study accounts also for the burden and
revenue of national social insurance contributions. In our study, we do not
account for the costs of German employers to comply with the income tax.
As there is no appropriate data to isolate the compliance burden of German
employers resulting from the PAYE system, we refrain from discussing this
aspect in more detail.
Conclusion
Within our article, we analyzed the compliance burden of German house-
holds resulting from the income tax. To account for the fact that compliance
cost estimates may be biased, we calculated a lower- and an upper-bound
estimate. We found strong evidence that self-employment increases the
burden of tax compliance to a considerable extent. While the average costs
of self-employed taxpayers lie in a range of €774 to €1,226, other taxpayers
(almost exclusively employees and public officials) bear on average €174 to
€249. Accounting for other control parameters, self-employment increases
the cost burden by 166 to 186 percent.
Taking into account that the tax obligations of German small busi-
nesses and self-employed persons not only include compliance activities
for income tax purposes but also duties resulting from the value-added tax,
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local business taxes, and (in case of an employer) wage taxes, and social
insurance contributions, the burden of tax compliance may not only affect
the economic resources of private households but also interfere their
economic decision making. According to Djankov et al. (2002), market
entry costs can negatively affect economic efficiency. Grilo and Irigoyen
(2006) find evidence that administrative complexity may impair
self-employment.
We also find that income and the demand for external advice positively
affect the compliance burden. Furthermore, the time burden of taxpayers
with a university degree is significantly higher, while the time effort of
female taxpayers is considerably lower. This outcome could be partially
driven by the fact that some groups of taxpayers are more interested in tax
planning. If well-educated or male taxpayers have lower marginal planning
costs or a preference for aggressive planning (Alstadsæter and Jacob 2012),
this might result in higher cost burdens. However, Murphy (2004) finds for
Australian taxpayers a negative correlation between education and the prob-
ability to have an aggressive tax agent.
There is also evidence that joint filing of dual-income earners results in a
significant reduction of compliance time. This outcome can be explained by
economies of scale that have been also documented in relation to other
aspects of the compliance process (Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick
1989; Allers 1994). This can be taken as an argument that joint tax returns
are not only an instrument to ensure tax equity but also a method to enhance
the cost-efficiency of a tax system.
Interpreting our results, it should be considered that our data are based on
self-reported information of German income taxpayers. Therefore, mea-
surement error is a relevant problem. Furthermore, our database is of limited
size (altogether 894 usable observations including non-filers and 629 tax filers)
and based on quota sampling. In addition, there are less cost categories than in
previous contributions. We rely on face-to-face interviews and post-
stratification weights to address these issues. Furthermore, we calculate lower-
and upper-bound cost estimates and cross checks for our regressions.
Our aggregate cost estimate of private households resulting from Ger-
man income taxation lies in a range of 3.1 to 4.7 percent of the income tax
revenue (including solidarity tax surcharge). This proportion is higher than
the latest cost estimates in other European countries like Sweden and Spain,
but considerably lower than corresponding results for Australia and espe-
cially the United States. The high cost estimates and time burdens of the
US households in relation to Germany and other European countries could
partially be driven by the US self-assessment system as well as by the
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German PAYE system implying a cost reduction for wage earners. Further-
more, the US income tax system includes a number of complex aspects and
regulations that are not part of the German tax system (alternative minimum
tax, state income taxes in addition to the federal income tax, earned income
tax credit, and other issues).
It has to be considered that international comparisons on compliance cost
burdens are typically biased by methodological issues including the sampling
of taxpayers and the valuation of the time burden. From this perspective,
comparative studies will be necessary to get a deeper understanding of the
main causes of tax complexity as well as the main possibilities for tax
simplification. A corresponding approach should be promising to answer the
question of Slemrod (1996), which is the simplest tax system of them all.
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Notes
1. Within his survey of German businesses, Klein-Blenkers (1980) asked for the
time allocated to a number of activities as well as for an aggregated time burden.
On average, the aggregate time estimate was substantially smaller compared to
the sum of itemized compliance activities.
2. To derive an upper-bound estimate, we compare the distribution of different items in
our database (controlling for post-stratification weights) for self-employed taxpayers
and employees with the corresponding distribution as documented by DeLuca et al.
(2005) for the United States. We pursue two objectives: (1) the concept of record-
keeping of DeLuca et al. (2005) might be broader compared to our data; (2) the study
includes a higher number of compliance activities (e.g., ‘Tax Planning’). To account
for criterion (1), we compare the proportion of time spent on bookkeeping activities
to the time spent on the preparation of the tax return. From our perspective,
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‘Preparing Tax Return’ in terms of our study conforms to three categories of DeLuca
et al. (2005) (‘Form Completion’, ‘Form Submission,’ and ‘Gathering Materials’),
while ‘Collecting Receipts’ can be taken as proxy for ‘Recordkeeping.’ Using this
proportion, we calculate a multiplier accounting for differences in the definition of
bookkeeping requirements. To account for (2), we compare the time spent on book-
keeping and the preparation of the tax return to other activities that are not directly
addressed in our questionnaire (namely ‘Paid Professional’, ‘Tax Planning,’ and
‘Using IRS Services’). An overview of the distribution of the time to the different
activities in our study compared to DeLuca et al. (2005) is given in table 7.
The corresponding upper-bound value exceeds the lower-bound value by 25.2
percent (74.2 percent) in case of the employed (self-employed) taxpayers. As time
categories, which are not directly addressed in the German questionnaire, could have
been allocated elsewhere (e.g., ‘Tax Planning’), the corrected upper bound should be
considered as a maximum value.
3. An analysis of German data (German Socio-economic Panel, 2007) shows that
actual and contracted working hours vary significantly. Therefore, we rely on
self-estimates both for employed and self-employed taxpayers.
4. There might be two reasons for filing a tax return. (1) In spite of the pay-as-you-earn
(PAYE) system, there might be an obligation to file a tax return. This is mainly rel-
evant for nonwage income. (2) The PAYE system does not account for all deduc-
tions and tax credits. Therefore, filing a tax return is, for example, attractive if the
taxpayer wants to claim additional tax credits or itemized deductions.
5. As shown by Kennedy (1981), the relative change can be approximated by
EXP a^i  1=2  Var a^ið Þ
 
 1, with the estimated regression coefficient a^i and the
variance Var a^ið Þ.
Table 7. Distribution of the Time Effort.













Recordkeeping 39 65 Collecting receipts 59 72
Form completion 19 7
Form submission 6 2 Preparing tax return 41 28
Gathering materials 8 7
Paid professional 5 7 – – –
Tax planning 21 11 – – –
Using internal
revenue services
2 1 – – –
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6. We do not use a ratio of time effort to taxable income in this case. While the
overall compliance burden should generally increase in income (monetized time
effort is measured by earnings per hour), this is not necessarily the case for the
compliance time.
References
Allers, Maarten A. 1994. Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and
Public Transfers in the Netherlands. Groningen, the Netherlands: Woltersgroep.
Alm, James. 1996. ‘‘What Is an ‘Optimal’ Tax System?’’ National Tax Journal 49:
117–33.
Alm, James. 1999. ‘‘Tax Compliance and Administration.’’ In Handbook on
Taxation, edited by Hildreth W. Bartley and James A. Richardson, 741–68. New
York: Marcel Dekker.
Alstadsæter, Annette, and Martin Jacob. 2012. ‘‘Who Participates in Income Shift-
ing?’’ FAccT Center Working Paper No. 08/2012, WHU—Otto Beisheim School
of Management, Vallendar, Germany.
Berinsky, Adam J. 2006. ‘‘American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The
Analysis of Quota-controlled Sample Survey Data.’’ The Public Opinion
Quarterly 70:499–529.
Blaufus, Kay, Sebastian Eichfelder, and Jochen Hundsdoerfer. 2011. ‘‘The Hidden
Burden of the Income Tax: Compliance Costs of German Individuals.’’ School
of Business & Economics Discussion Paper No. 2011/6, Freie Universita¨t, Berlin,
Germany.
Blazˇic´, Helena. 2004. ‘‘Personal Income Tax Compliance Costs at an Individual
Level in Croatia.’’ Australian Tax Forum 19:325–52.
Blumenthal, Marsha, and Joel Slemrod. 1992. ‘‘The Compliance Cost of the U.S.
Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look after Tax Reform.’’ National
Tax Journal 45:185–202.
Cardinaels, Eddy, and Eva Labro. 2008. ‘‘On the Determinants of Measurement
Error in Time-driven Costing.’’ The Accounting Review 83:735–56.
Council of Economic Advisors. 2001. Economic Indicators April 2001. Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Croson, Rachel, and Uri Gneezy. 2009. ‘‘Gender Differences in Preferences.’’
Journal of Economic Literature 47:448–74.
Cumming, Robert G. 1990. ‘‘Is Probability Sampling Always Better? A Comparison
of Results from a Quota and a Probability Sample Survey.’’ Community Health
Studies 14:132–7.
Delgado Lobo, Maria L., Javier Salinas-Jime´nez, and Jose´ F. Sanz Sanz. 2001.
‘‘Hidden Tax Burden of the Personal Income Tax: Evidence from the Recent Tax
Reform in Spain.’’ Australian Tax Forum 16:463–82.
826 Public Finance Review 42(6)
DeLuca, Donald, Arnold Green, John Guyton, Shaun Hennessy, and Audrey Kindlon.
2005. ‘‘Measuring the Tax Compliance Burden of Small Businesses.’’ Paper
presented at the Internal Revenue Service Research Conference, Washington,
DC, June 7–8, 2005, 75–95.
Diaz, Consuelo, and Maria L. Delgado. 1995. ‘‘The Compliance Costs of Personal
Income Tax in Spain.’’ In Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy,
edited by Cedric T. Sandford, 210–25. Bath, UK: Fiscal Publications.
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shlei-
fer. 2002. ‘‘The Regulation of Entry.’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:
1–37.
Eichfelder, Sebastian, Frank Hechtner, Nima Massarat, and Christian Sielaff. 2012.
‘‘The Demand for Tax Preparation Services: Evidence from German
Non-business Taxpayers.’’ Die Betriebswirtschaft/Business Administration
Review 72:491–520.
Eichfelder, Sebastian, and Michael Schorn. 2012. ‘‘Tax Compliance Costs: A Busi-
ness Administration Perspective.’’ FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 68:
191–230.
Erard, Brian, and Chih-Chin Ho. 2003. ‘‘Explaining the U.S. Income Tax Compli-
ance Continuum.’’ eJournal of Tax Research 1:93–105.
Evans, Chris. 2003. ‘‘Studying the Studies: An Overview of Recent Research into
Taxation Operating Costs.’’ eJournal of Tax Research 1:64–92.
Evans, Chris. 2008. ‘‘Taxation Compliance and Administrative Costs: An
Overview.’’ In Tax Compliance Costs for Companies in an Enlarged European
Union, edited by Michael Lang, Christine Obbermair, Josef Schuch, Claus
Staringer, and Patrick Weninger, 447–63. Vienna, Austria: Linde.
Gallopel-Morvan, Karine, Crawford Moodie, David Hammond, Figen Eker, Emma-
nuelle Beguinot, and Yves Martinet. 2010. ‘‘Consumer Understanding of
Cigarette Emission Labeling.’’ European Journal of Public Health 21:373–5.
German Federal Statistical Office. 2008a. Qualita¨tsbericht Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik. Wiesbaden: German Federal Statistical Office.
German Federal Statistical Office. 2008b. Statistical Yearbook 2008. Wiesbaden:
German Federal Statistical Office.
Grilo, Isabel, and Jesus-Maria Irigoyen. 2006. ‘‘Entrepreneurship in the EU: To
Wish and Not to Be.’’ Small Business Economics 26:305–18.
Guyton, John L., John F. O’Hare, Michael P. Stavrianos, and Eric J. Toder. 2003.
‘‘Estimating the Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax.’’ National
Tax Journal 51:673–88.
Hansford, Ann, and John Hasseldine. 2012. ‘‘Tax Compliance Costs of Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs): The Case of the UK.’’ eJournal of Tax
Research 10:288–303.
Blaufus et al. 827
Kayser, Gunter, Rainhard Clemens, Hans-Ju¨rgen Wolter, and Michael Schorn.
2004. Bu¨rokratiekosten kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen: Gutachten im
Auftrag des Bundesministeriums fu¨r Wirtschaft und Arbeit. Wiesbaden,
Germany: Deutscher Universita¨tsverlag.
Kennedy, Peter E. 1981. ‘‘Estimation with Correctly Interpreted Dummy Variables
in Semi-Logarithmic Equations.’’ The American Economic Review 71:801.
Klein-Blenkers, Fritz. 1980. Die Belastung der Industrieunternehmen durch admin-
istrative Leistungen fu¨r den Staat—unter besonderer Beru¨cksichtigung kleiner
und mittlerer Unternehmen. Go¨ttingen, Germany: Otto Schwarz.
Klun, Maja. 2004. ‘‘Compliance Costs for Personal Income Tax in a Transition
Country: The Case of Slovenia.’’ Fiscal Studies 25:93–104.
Malmer, Ha˚kan. 1995. ‘‘The Swedish Tax Reform in 1990-91 and Tax Compliance
Costs in Sweden.’’ In Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy, edited by
Cedric T. Sandford. 226–62. Bath, UK: Fiscal Publications.
Mathieu, Laurence, Catherine Waddams Price, and Francis Antwi. 2010. ‘‘The
Distribution of UK Income Tax Compliance Costs.’’ Applied Economics 42:
351–68.
Murphy, Kristina. 2004. ‘‘Aggressive Tax Planning: Differentiating those Playing
the Game from those Who Don’t.’’ Journal of Economic Psychology 25:
307–29.
Pope, Jeff, and Richard Fayle. 1990. ‘‘The Compliance Costs of Personal Income
Taxation in Australia 1986/87: Empirical Results.’’ Department of Economics
Discussion Paper No. 90.06, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, Australia.
RWI (Rheinisch-Westfa¨lisches Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung). 2003. Ermittlung
von Tax Compliance Cost: Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der
Finanzen. Essen, Germany: RWI.
Sandford, Cedric T. 1995. ‘‘Improving the Methodologies.’’ In Tax Compliance
Costs: Measurement and Policy, edited by Cedric T. Sandford, 275–98. Bath,
UK: Fiscal Publications.
Sandford, Cedric T., Michael G. Godwin, and Peter J. Hardwick. 1989. Administra-
tive and Compliance Costs of Taxation. Bath, UK: Fiscal Publications.
Slemrod, Joel. 1989. ‘‘The Return to Tax Simplification: An Econometric Analysis.’’
Public Finance Quarterly 17:3–27.
Slemrod, Joel. 1996. ‘‘Which Is the Simplest Tax System of Them All?’’ In The
Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, edited by Henry Aaron and
William Gale, 355–91. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Slemrod, Joel, and Nikki Sorum. 1984. ‘‘The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individ-
ual Income Tax System.’’ National Tax Journal 37:461–74.
Slemrod, Joel, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1996. ‘‘The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal
Costs of Funds.’’ International Monetary Fund—Staff Papers 43:172–98.
828 Public Finance Review 42(6)
Throsby, David, and Glenn A. Withers. 1986. ‘‘Strategic Bias and Demand for
Public Goods: Theory and an Application to the Arts.’’ Journal of Public
Economics 31:307–27.
Tiebel, Christoph. 1986. U¨berwa¨lzte Kosten der Gesetze: Eine empirische Analyse
der Folgekosten fu¨r den Markt. Go¨ttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Tran-Nam, Binh, Chris Evans, Michael Walpole, and Katherine Ritchie. 2000. ‘‘Tax
Compliance Costs: Research Methodology and Empirical Evidence from
Australia.’’ National Tax Journal 53:229–52.
Vaillancourt, Franc¸ois. 1989. The Administrative and Compliance Costs of the
Personal Income Tax and Payroll Tax System in Canada, 1986. Toronto: Cana-
dian Tax Foundation.
Vaillancourt, Franc¸ois. 2010. ‘‘The Cost to Canadians of Complying with the
Personal Income Tax.’’ Calgary, Canada: The Fraser Institute.
Wagner, Gert G., Joachim R. Frick, and Ju¨rgen Schupp. 2007. ‘‘The German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP): Evolution, Scope and Enhancements.’’
Schmollers Jahrbuch/Journal of Applied Social Science Studies 127:139–69.
Wallschutzky, Ian. 1995. ‘‘Costs of Compliance for Small Business: Results from
Twelve Case Studies in Australia.’’ In Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and
Policy, edited by Cedric T. Sandford, 275–98. Bath, UK: Fiscal Publications.
Author Biographies
Kay Blaufus is a full professor at the Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover, Germany. He
earned his PhD at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin. Thereafter, he was working as an
assistant professor at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin and as a full professor at the
Viadrina Universita¨t Frankfurt (Oder). His main research interests are taxation and
behavioral economics.
Sebastian Eichfelder is an associate professor at the Bergische Universita¨t
Wuppertal, Germany. He earned his PhD at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin and worked
as an adjunct professor at the Universita¨t Leipzig. His main research interests are tax
complexity, tax compliance burdens, tax planning, and effects of taxes on invest-
ment and the allocation of assets.
Jochen Hundsdoerfer is a full professor at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin. He earned his
PhD at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin and worked as a postdoc at the Viadrina Universita¨t
Frankfurt (Oder). Thereafter, he was a full professor at the Ruhr-Universita¨t Bochum.
His main research interests are tax planning, tax compliance, and tax accounting.
Blaufus et al. 829
